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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 
With the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 
Congress added comprehensive medical device approval 
processes to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 
prescribing tiers of federal requirements for certain devices 
corresponding to the device’s inherent risk level.  In exchange 
for compliance with the strictest federal mandates, Congress 
afforded manufacturers express preemption from state laws 
imposing different or additional “safety or effectiveness” 
requirements for those devices.  21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(2).  This 
case presents an issue of first impression among the Courts of 
Appeals: how courts should apply that express preemption 
provision to state law tort claims challenging the design and 
manufacture of a medical device comprised of multiple 
components, some of which are from “Class III” medical 
devices subject to federal requirements, Riegel v. Medtronic, 
Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 322-23 (2008), and some of which are 
from medical devices that carry a different class designation 
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and are not subject to those requirements, see Medtronic, Inc. 
v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475-78, 494-95 (1996).  
 
Because the plaintiffs’ negligence, strict liability, and 
breach of implied warranty claims in their Second Amended 
Complaint are expressly preempted, we will affirm the 
District Court’s ruling in that respect.  But because the 
plaintiffs adequately pleaded other, non-preempted claims, 
and because jurisdictional discovery is warranted with respect 
to personal jurisdiction over one of the defendants, we will 
reverse the District Court’s dismissal of some of the 
plaintiffs’ claims in their Third Amended Complaint, vacate 
the District Court’s personal jurisdiction ruling, and remand 
for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
I. Background 
 
After Walter Shuker underwent a hip replacement 
surgery that resulted in unexpected complications, he and his 
wife, Vivian Shuker, brought tort claims against Smith & 
Nephew, Inc. (“Smith & Nephew”), the manufacturer of his 
hip replacement system, and Smith & Nephew, PLC (“PLC”), 
the manufacturer’s parent company.  Before turning to the 
details of Mr. and Mrs. Shuker’s dispute with Smith & 
Nephew and with PLC, we review the relevant statutory and 
regulatory scheme for context. 
 
A. Statutory and Regulatory Context 
 
For purposes of federal statutes governing medical 
devices, the term “device” is a broad one, encompassing 
instruments, machines, implants, and “other similar or 
related” articles, and “including any component, part, or 
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accessory” of those articles.  21 U.S.C. § 321(h).  “Device” 
refers not just to “replacement heart valves, implanted 
cerebella stimulators, and pacemaker pulse generators,” but 
also to “such devices as elastic bandages and examination 
gloves,” as well as to the constituent parts of those items.  
Riegel, 552 U.S. at 316-17.   
 
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act did not 
originally authorize federal regulation in connection with the 
introduction of new medical devices, but, over time, 
consumers and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) began voicing “mounting . . . concern” about the 
unexamined health risks of devices being introduced to the 
public.  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 475-76.  Several states responded to 
those concerns by adopting regulatory measures, but 
Congress “stepped in” by enacting the Medical Device 
Amendments of 1976, “which swept back some state 
obligations and imposed a regime of detailed federal 
oversight.”  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 315-16.  As explained in more 
detail below, Congress’s approach here, as in other regulatory 
contexts,1 was twofold: first, it established a system of federal 
regulation over the introduction of new devices, instituting 
tiered federal requirements calibrated to each device’s risk 
level, and, second, it enacted a provision stating that federal 
                                              
1 See, e.g., Federal Environmental Pesticide Control 
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, sec. 2, §§ 3-13, 24, 86 Stat. 
973, 979-92, 997 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a-
136k, 136v); Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 
Pub. L. No. 89-92, §§ 4-5, 79 Stat. 282, 283 (1965) (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1333-1334). 
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medical device requirements supersede any different or 
additional state safety or effectiveness requirements.  See 
Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 
sec. 2, §§ 513-516, 521, 90 Stat. 539, 540-60, 562 (codified 
as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360f, 360k).  
 
1. Medical Device Approval Procedures 
Approval procedures for new medical devices under 
the Medical Device Amendments vary depending on a 
device’s class designation.  The statute divides devices into 
three classes “based on the risk that they pose to the public” 
and applies more rigorous prerequisites to devices that pose 
greater risks.  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 476-77; see 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 360c(a)(1), 360d, 360e.  Because Class I devices pose the 
least risks, Class II devices are “more harmful,” and Class III 
devices pose the greatest risks, Lohr, 518 U.S. at 477; see 21 
U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1), Class III devices receive “the most 
federal oversight,” and Class I and II devices receive much 
less, Riegel, 552 U.S. at 316-17.  We describe the FDA’s 
comprehensive approval procedures for Class III devices 
before summarizing the more lenient approval procedures for 
Class I and Class II devices. 
 
a. Class III Devices: Premarket Approval 
Before becoming available to the public, a Class III 
device must receive “premarket approval” through a process 
by which the device’s manufacturer “provide[s] reasonable 
assurance of [the device’s] safety and effectiveness.”  21 
U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C).  The premarket approval process “is a 
rigorous one,” requiring manufacturers to “submit detailed 
information regarding the safety and efficacy of their devices, 
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which the FDA then reviews, spending an average of 1,200 
hours on each submission.”  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 477. 
 
Submissions are typically “multivolume 
application[s],” and thus the time devoted by the FDA to 
reviewing manufacturers’ premarket approval submissions is, 
unsurprisingly, substantial.  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 317-18.  
Pursuant to the Medical Device Amendments, premarket 
approval applications must include, among other things, “a 
full statement of the device’s components, ingredients, and 
properties,” id. at 318 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 
21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(1)(B), which the FDA may choose to 
subject to “performance standards,” 21 U.S.C. § 360d(a)(1), 
(a)(2)(B)(i).  And they likewise must provide “a specimen of 
the proposed labeling,” which shall specify “conditions of 
use” under which the FDA will evaluate the device’s safety 
and effectiveness.  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 318; see 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360e(c)(1)(F).  The FDA must also determine that the 
labeling is not false or misleading before granting premarket 
approval to the device.  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 318; see 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360e(d)(1)(A). 
 
After reviewing an application, the FDA grants 
premarket approval only if, based on a weighing of “any 
probable benefit to health from the use of the device against 
any probable risk of injury or illness from such use,” it finds 
“there is a ‘reasonable assurance’ of the device’s ‘safety and 
effectiveness.’”  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 318 (quoting 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 360c(a)(2)(C), 360e(d)).  Once approved, the device may 
be manufactured, advertised, and distributed to the public, but 
those marketing activities may not be done in a manner 
“inconsistent with . . . the [premarket] approval order for the 
device.”  21 C.F.R. § 814.80.  To that end, a manufacturer 
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wishing to make “incremental change[s]” that affect the 
device’s safety and effectiveness must submit a supplemental 
premarket approval application.  21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(5); 
accord Riegel, 552 U.S. at 319. 
 
Notwithstanding the strictures imposed on 
manufacturers, the Act allows more leeway to health care 
providers.  Even after the FDA grants premarket approval to a 
medical device or to any supplements, it does not “limit or 
interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to 
prescribe or administer any legally marketed device to a 
patient . . . .”  21 U.S.C. § 396.  And physicians’ ability to 
prescribe legally marketed devices as they see fit means that 
“‘off-label’ usage,” or use “for some other purpose than that 
for which [a device] has been approved by the FDA,” is “an 
accepted and necessary corollary of the FDA’s mission to 
regulate . . . without directly interfering with the practice of 
medicine.”  Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 
U.S. 341, 350 (2001).  Although the statute thus expressly 
contemplates the possibility that physicians may use a Class 
III device for unapproved purposes, a manufacturer may not 
vary the design or manufacture of the pre-approved device, 
even in anticipation of such uses.  See 21 U.S.C. § 396.   
 
b. Class I and Class II Devices: § 510(k) 
Approval 
In contrast to the rigorous premarket approval process 
for Class III devices, Class I and Class II devices are subject 
to “a limited form of review” set forth at 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) 
and known as the “§ 510(k) process” (reflecting the number 
of the relevant section in the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act).  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 478.  Compared to a 
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premarket approval application, compliance with the § 510(k) 
process requires a far less exhaustive submission.  See 21 
U.S.C. § 360(k); 21 C.F.R. § 807.87.  In many cases, § 510(k) 
approval rests not on proof of the device’s safety, but merely 
on a finding that a device is “substantially equivalent” to a 
preexisting approved medical device.  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 478.  
A § 510(k) approval thus provides comparatively “little 
protection to the public.”  Id. at 493. 
 
2. Express Preemption Provision 
The Medical Device Amendments’ comprehensive and 
tiered approval procedures for medical devices leave only 
limited room for additional state regulation, especially 
considering the statute contains a broad express preemption 
provision.  This provision proclaims that “no State . . . may 
establish or continue in effect with respect to a device . . . any 
requirement” that “is different from, or in addition to,” any 
federal requirement and that relates either “to the safety or 
effectiveness of the device” or “to any other matter” included 
in a federal requirement applicable to the device.  21 U.S.C. 
§ 360k(a).2  The statute thus preempts any state requirement 
that has “the effect of establishing a substantive requirement 
for [the] specific device” in question that relates to safety, 
                                              
2 The express preemption provision includes an 
exception for state requirements that the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services has exempted from preemption by 
regulation, see 21 U.S.C. § 360k(b), but because the Shukers’ 
common law tort claims are not included within the 
Secretary’s regulatory exemptions, see 21 C.F.R. §§ 808.53 
to .101, that exception is not pertinent here. 
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effectiveness, or “any other matter” that forms a federal 
requirement, so long as the state requirement is “different 
from, or in addition to,” the federal mandate.  Lohr, 518 U.S. 
at 499-500 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a); 21 C.F.R. 
§ 808.1(d)(6)(ii)).  The “overarching concern” behind this 
provision is “that pre-emption occur only where a particular 
state requirement threatens to interfere with a specific federal 
interest.”  Id. at 500. 
 
Application of the express preemption provision tracks 
the Medical Device Amendments’ tiered statutory scheme for 
medical device approvals.  Because manufacturers of Class I 
and Class II devices receive only § 510(k) approval and 
emerge from the approval process with no safety review 
specific to those devices, manufacturers do not receive the 
benefit of express preemption, see Lohr, 518 U.S. at 492-94.  
In contrast, because a manufacturer of a Class III device must 
receive premarket approval, clear “federal safety review” that 
“is specific to [the] individual device[],” and thereby satisfy 
federal requirements applicable to the device, the 
manufacturer of that Class III device receives express 
preemption protections from state requirements that are 
“different from, or in addition to,” the federal requirements 
imposed on the device through the premarket approval 
process.  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 322-23 (quoting 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360k(a)(1)).  This protection inures to manufacturers 
regardless of how a device is used by third parties.  See 
21 U.S.C. § 396 (contemplating off-label uses of devices by 
physicians); see also Caplinger v. Medtronic, Inc., 784 F.3d 
1335, 1343-45 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that the fact that a 
claim alleges off-label use does not “insulate” it from express 
preemption). 
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But state laws are not shut out entirely.  Even for Class 
III devices, the Medical Device Amendments’ express 
preemption provision does not reach “parallel” claims, i.e., 
claims premised on state requirements that merely incorporate 
applicable federal requirements and therefore are not 
“different from, or in addition to,” federal requirements.  
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 494-95 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)(1)); 
accord Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330.   
 
The question of first impression we confront today3 
arises at the intersection of these different classes of devices 
with their different approval schemes: How do we apply the 
Medical Device Amendments’ express preemption provision 
to a “hybrid system,” i.e., a system that is itself a “device” but 
that is comprised of Class II components in addition to one or 
more Class III components?4  We recount the facts of the 
parties’ dispute before turning to our answer. 
                                              
3 Cf. Mink v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 860 F.3d 1319, 
1323, 1327-33 (11th Cir. 2017) (addressing preemption as 
applied to a device comprised of only Class III components, 
not as applied to a device comprised of a Class III component 
and Class II components); Spellman v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 
No. 16-8080, 2016 WL 5364206, at *1, *3-4 (D. Ariz. Sept. 
26, 2016) (same), appeal docketed, No. 17-15351 (9th Cir. 
Feb. 28, 2017). 
4 Here, and when not quoting another source, we use 
the term “component” to mean, collectively, “component, 
part, or accessory,” 21 U.S.C. § 321(h), to the extent there are 
any differences between the three.  By “system” we mean, in 
Mr. Shuker’s case, the entire hip replacement “device” 
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B. Factual and Procedural History5 
 
Mr. Shuker underwent total hip replacement surgery in 
2009.  The hip replacement system “implant[ed]” was 
regulated as a “device” under the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321(h), but was comprised of 
multiple components, all manufactured by Smith & Nephew.  
Some components replaced the top of Mr. Shuker’s thighbone 
(or femur) with a metal head, metal sleeve, and a stem 
connecting the metal head to the thighbone, while another 
component rested on his hip socket (or acetabulum).  These 
components were all Class II devices approved through the 
relatively lenient § 510(k) process.  A final component, the 
“R3 metal liner,” mediated the connection between his hip 
socket and his thighbone and was seated atop the hip socket 
component, App. 42; unlike the other components, the liner 
underwent the rigorous premarket approval process as a 
supplemental component for a separate Smith & Nephew 
                                                                                                     
implanted in his hip, including all of its constituent 
components.  Id. 
5 The factual summary below draws from record 
evidence that we consider in reviewing the District Court’s 
summary judgment ruling regarding preemption, and its 
dismissal of PLC for lack of personal jurisdiction.  But we 
consider only the complaint, its exhibits, “undisputedly 
authentic document[s]” upon which the plaintiffs’ claims are 
based, and the public record in reviewing the District Court’s 
dismissal of the Shukers’ Third Amended Complaint for 
failure to state a claim.  Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White 
Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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Class III device, the Birmingham Hip Resurfacing System.  
Shuker v. Smith & Nephew PLC, No. 13-6158, 2015 WL 
1475368, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2015).  Together with the 
metal head and metal head sleeve replacing the top of 
Mr. Shuker’s thighbone, the metal liner created a “metal-on-
metal articulation” at Mr. Shuker’s hip socket.  Id. at *3. 
 
As is customary, the FDA’s premarket approval 
requirements for the liner extended to the liner’s 
accompanying labeling, which was required to state that “the 
R3 metal liner [was] intended for use as part of the 
[Birmingham Hip Resurfacing System] only” and that “the 
R3 metal liner must be replaced with an R3 poly[ethylene] 
liner” if the Birmingham Hip Resurfacing System were 
abandoned or later revised in favor of a total hip replacement 
system.  Id. at *2.  Thus, as the parties agree, see Appellant’s 
Br. 6-7; Appellee Smith & Nephew’s Br. 6, because the R3 
metal liner’s labeling reflected that the FDA had not approved 
the liner for use outside of the Birmingham Hip Resurfacing 
System or in a total hip replacement system, Smith & 
Nephew’s promotional materials marketing the R3 metal liner 
as an “option for its R3 Acetabular System,” a separate hip 
system,  App. 14, constituted “off-label promotion,” Shuker, 
2015 WL 1475368, at *13, and the liner’s use in Mr. Shuker’s 
total hip replacement system constituted an “off-label” use,  
Buckman Co., 531 U.S. at 350.  
 
About twenty-one months after his hip replacement 
surgery, Mr. Shuker “began developing increasing pain and 
discomfort in his buttocks, groin, and thigh, limiting his daily 
activities.”  Shuker, 2015 WL 1475368, at *3.  His surgeon 
performed an aspiration procedure that revealed “metallic 
debris” within Mr. Shuker’s body, indicating that 
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“Mr. Shuker’s pain was caused by metal sensitivity due to the 
degeneration of the metal-on-metal articulation,” which 
needed to be replaced to relieve his pain.  Id.  Mr. Shuker 
then underwent revision surgery to replace the R3 metal liner, 
followed by additional surgeries to remove and replace his 
entire hip replacement system when the first revision surgery 
did not relieve his pain. 
 
Seeking to hold Smith & Nephew and its parent 
company PLC liable for Mr. Shuker’s hip replacement 
complications and for Mrs. Shuker’s loss of consortium, the 
Shukers filed suit, bringing various common law claims, and 
later adding claims based on violations of federal law.6  PLC 
moved for dismissal from the case for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, and Smith & Nephew moved for summary 
judgment on some of the Shukers’ claims, asserting that the 
Medical Device Amendments expressly preempted those 
claims.   
 
Without an opinion but with a lengthy explanatory 
footnote accompanying its order, the District Court granted 
PLC’s motion to dismiss.  In a separate order and opinion, the 
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Smith & 
Nephew, holding as relevant to this appeal that the 
negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranty 
claims in the Shukers’ Second Amended Complaint were 
                                              
6 The Shukers originally filed suit in Pennsylvania 
state court, but Smith & Nephew and PLC removed the case 
to federal court.  The District Court had subject-matter 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).  
15 
 
preempted because “the heart of each of [the Shukers’] 
claims” challenged the safety and effectiveness of the 
R3 metal liner, which had received premarket approval, was 
therefore subject to federal requirements, and, hence, gave 
Smith & Nephew the benefit of express preemption.  Shuker, 
2015 WL 1475368, at *6-11, *17.  The District Court also 
granted the Shukers the opportunity to amend their complaint 
against Smith & Nephew as to their non-preempted claims 
alleging off-label promotion in violation of federal law, and 
the Shukers proceeded to file a Third Amended Complaint.  
Ultimately, however, the District Court dismissed that 
complaint for failure to state a claim.  See Shuker v. Smith & 
Nephew PLC, 211 F. Supp. 3d 695, 700-05 (E.D. Pa. 2016).   
 
This appeal followed.7  
 
II. Discussion 
 
We resolve the questions presented by this case in 
three parts.  First, we consider whether the negligence, strict 
liability, and breach of implied warranty claims in the 
Shukers’ Second Amended Complaint are expressly 
preempted.  See Section II.A, infra.  Second, we review the 
District Court’s decision to dismiss the claims in the Shukers’ 
Third Amended Complaint with prejudice.  See Section II.B, 
infra.  Finally, we consider personal jurisdiction as to PLC 
and whether jurisdictional discovery is warranted.  See 
Section II.C, infra. 
 
                                              
7 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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A. Preemption 
 
The District Court granted summary judgment to 
Smith & Nephew on express preemption grounds with respect 
to the negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied 
warranty claims in the Shukers’ Second Amended Complaint.  
We review that grant de novo, Steele v. Cicchi, 855 F.3d 494, 
500 (3d Cir. 2017), and will affirm if Smith & Nephew has 
established that “there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact” and, viewing the facts in the light most 
favorable to plaintiffs, Smith & Nephew “is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also 
Steele, 855 F.3d at 500. 
 
Here, that decision turns on whether the Medical 
Device Amendments expressly preempt the Shukers’ 
negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranty 
claims in their Second Amended Complaint—the primary 
issue addressed in the parties’ original briefing, as well as 
their supplemental briefing and an amicus brief filed by the 
FDA at the request of the Court.8  We undertake this analysis 
                                              
8 While the supplemental briefing and the FDA’s 
submission address implied preemption as well as express 
preemption, we confine our analysis to express preemption 
today.  The Medical Device Amendments can preempt state 
common law claims against medical device manufacturers 
both expressly and impliedly, see Buckman Co., 531 U.S. at 
348 & n.2, and the existence of an express preemption 
provision like § 360k(a), as the FDA points out, “does not 
ordinarily alter the normal operation of implied-preemption 
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by (1) reviewing the two-step framework for determining 
whether a claim concerning a “device” is preempted under the 
Amendments’ express preemption provision, (2) determining 
what constitutes the “device” when a system is comprised of 
components with mixed-class designations, and (3) applying 
the framework applicable to that “device” to the facts of this 
case. 
 
1. Principles Governing Express Preemption 
Under the Medical Device Amendments 
In products liability actions like this one, the Supreme 
Court has specified that “the historic primacy of state 
regulation of matters of health and safety” requires us to 
apply the “presumption against the pre-emption of state 
                                                                                                     
principles.”  FDA Amicus Br. 13.  However, because Smith 
& Nephew raised only express preemption arguments before 
the District Court, we conclude implied preemption 
arguments are not properly before us on appeal, see Holk v. 
Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 335-36 (3d Cir. 
2009).  Even if they were, because, e.g., Smith & Nephew 
preserved its preemption defense and did not “explicitly 
disclaim[] the applicability of [implied] preemption,” Holk, 
575 F.3d at 336, we would still begin with (and here, would 
end with) express preemption, for the statute’s plain wording 
“necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ 
preemptive intent,” Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. 
Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 594 (2011) (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. 
v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)). 
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police power regulations.”9  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485 (quoting 
Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992)); 
accord Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 & n.3 (2009).  We 
therefore begin with the principle that “the historic police 
powers of the States,” such as their power to regulate “matters 
of health and safety,” are “not to be superseded” unless 
preemption “was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress.”  Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).  Congress’s intent 
is our “ultimate touchstone,” and “we look to the language, 
structure, and purpose of the relevant statutory and regulatory 
scheme to develop a reasoned understanding of the way in 
which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding 
                                              
9 We disagree with Smith & Nephew’s assertion that 
“[a]ny presumption against express preemption no longer 
exists.”  Appellee Smith & Nephew’s Br. 21.  Smith & 
Nephew relies on a Supreme Court case that addressed 
whether the federal Bankruptcy Code’s express preemption 
provision preempts a Puerto Rico statute, see Puerto Rico v. 
Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1945-46 (2016) 
(discussing 11 U.S.C. § 903(1)), but that case did not address 
preemption of claims invoking “historic . . . state regulation 
of matters of health and safety,” such as the products liability 
claims at issue here, Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485.  As that case does 
not “directly control[]” here, we “leav[e] to [the Supreme 
Court] the prerogative of overruling its own decisions,” 
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997), and continue to 
apply the presumption against preemption to claims, like 
those in this case, that invoke “the historic police powers of 
the States,” Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485. 
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regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, and the 
law.”  Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 
687 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565; Lohr, 518 U.S. at 486). 
 
The express preemption provision of the Medical 
Device Amendments states that “no State or political 
subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with 
respect to a device. . . any requirement” that “is different 
from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under [the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act]” and that relates 
either “to the safety or effectiveness of the device” or “to any 
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the 
device under [the Act].”  21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).  Based on this 
statutory language, the Supreme Court, in Riegel v. 
Medtronic, Inc., prescribed a two-step framework for 
determining whether a state law cause of action is preempted.  
552 U.S. at 321-22.  First, we ask “whether the Federal 
Government has established requirements applicable” to the 
specific “device” at issue.  Id. at 321.  If it has, then, second, 
we ask “whether the [plaintiffs’] claims are based upon [state] 
requirements with respect to the device that are ‘different 
from, or in addition to,’ the federal ones, and that relate to 
safety and effectiveness.”  Id. at 321-22 (quoting 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360k(a)).  If we answer both questions in the affirmative, 
then the plaintiffs’ claims are expressly preempted.  See id. at 
321-30.  If, instead, the answer to the second question is no, 
then the “state duties in such a case ‘parallel,’ rather than add 
to, federal requirements,” and the claims are not preempted.  
Id. at 330 (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495).  
 
The first step of Riegel’s two-step framework, 
however, presumes agreement as to the “device” to which it 
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applies.  21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).  Therefore, before a court can 
apply the test, it must address a threshold question: What 
device is the subject of the “federal requirements”?  Riegel, 
552 U.S. at 321.  This question, while ancillary when each 
component of a system receives the same review by the FDA, 
is central when evaluating hybrid systems, like the one 
implanted in Mr. Shuker’s hip that contain both Class II and 
Class III components.  In that situation, neither the statute nor 
the relevant guidance from the Supreme Court, see Riegel, 
552 U.S. at 321, specifies how we should apply the Riegel 
test.  Do we analyze express preemption at the level of the 
system or the component?  That is the problem we confront 
today. 
 
2. Determining the Device at Issue 
The Shukers urge on appeal that the “device” at issue 
is the entire hybrid system itself.  Any other determination, 
they argue, would produce unfairness and incongruity by 
according preemption even when a component is used off-
label in a manner “that was never studied or approved by the 
FDA,” Appellant’s Br. 23 (capitalization omitted), merely 
because that component part was pre-approved for use with 
another system.  Appellees, seconded by the FDA, counter 
that analysis at the component level is the only way to 
harmonize various provisions of the statute.  We agree with 
Appellees for three reasons.   
 
First, analysis at the component level finds support in 
the text of the statute and regulations.  The Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act defines “device” to mean not simply 
a finished “instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, 
contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or 
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related article,” but also “any component, part, or accessory” 
of that article.  21 U.S.C. § 321(h).  Codified in 1938 with the 
original Act, this definition has always provided that the term 
“device” includes “components, parts, and accessories,” 
mirroring the definition for “drug” immediately preceding it, 
which was and is defined to include “articles intended for use 
as a component” of a drug.  Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 201(g), (h), 52 Stat. 
1040, 1041 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 321(g), (h)).  The implementing regulations, at least for 
quality control purposes, also describe “[c]omponent” to 
include “any raw material, substance, piece, part, software, 
firmware, labeling, or assembly which is intended to be 
included as part of the finished, packaged, and labeled 
device.”  21 C.F.R. § 820.3(c).10  
                                              
10 We note that neither the definition of “device,” nor 
the express preemption provision, makes any exception for 
instances where components that received premarket approval 
are used with components that did not receive such approval.  
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(h), 360k(a).  That is, no exception 
applies where components that confer express preemption 
protections (by virtue of being subject to federal requirements 
imposed through the premarket approval process) are used 
with components that do not.  And we cannot ourselves imply 
such an exception, for “[w]here Congress explicitly 
enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition,” 
United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 167 (1991), as it has 
done here in the statutory section containing the Medical 
Device Amendments’ express preemption provision, see 21 
U.S.C. § 360k(b); note 2, supra, then “additional exceptions 
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Second, the Act’s provision for off-label use supports a 
component-level analysis.  While the premarket approval 
process requires strict manufacturer compliance with respect 
to a device’s labeling and advertising, see 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 352(q)-(r), 360e(d)(1)(A), the statutory scheme 
contemplates that physicians will prescribe or administer 
components outside of a system with which the FDA 
approved their use.  As noted, off-label uses of devices (and 
components) are “an accepted and necessary corollary of the 
FDA’s mission to regulate in this area without directly 
interfering with the practice of medicine.”  Buckman Co., 531 
U.S. at 350.  Put differently, the regulatory landscape 
contemplates that devices may be broken down into 
component parts and individual components used separately 
by third parties.  Even then, however, premarket approval 
requirements “apply equally” to the components, as 
manufacturers “generally may not deviate from the 
requirements imposed through premarket approval regardless 
of how [a component] is used.”  FDA Amicus Br. 8; see also 
21 U.S.C. § 396.  Congress thereby has evinced an intent not 
to “discourage[]” device manufacturers “from seeking . . . 
approval of devices with potentially beneficial off-label uses 
for fear that such use might expose the manufacturer . . . to 
unpredictable civil liability,” Buckman Co., 531 U.S. at 350, 
and instead to “protect[] manufacturers that have complied 
                                                                                                     
are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary 
legislative intent,” Smith, 499 U.S. at 167. 
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with detailed federal requirements from being subject[] to 
liability under state law for doing what federal law required.”  
FDA Amicus Br. 9.  It is not surprising, then, that several 
courts have held that when a single component of a Class III 
device is used on its own, rather than in the premarket-
approved system, express preemption adheres to the 
individual premarket-approved component.  See, e.g., Arvizu 
v. Medtronic Inc., 41 F. Supp. 3d 783, 790 (D. Ariz. 2014); 
Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 32 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1036 (D. 
Ariz. 2014); Beavers-Gabriel v. Medtronic, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 
3d 1021, 1035 (D. Haw. 2014); Houston v. Medtronic, Inc., 
No. 13-1679, 2014 WL 1364455, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 
2014). 
 
Third, the FDA, “the federal agency to which 
Congress has delegated its authority to implement provisions 
of the Act,” Lohr, 518 U.S. at 496, also takes the position that 
because “the definition of ‘device’ encompasses . . . 
premarket-approved . . . system[s], and each of the 
‘component[s], part[s], [and] accessor[ies]’ of these devices,” 
the relevant device for preemption purposes must be 
evaluated at the component level.  FDA Amicus Br. 7 (all but 
first alteration in original) (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)).11  
                                              
11 We “do not defer to an agency’s view” concerning 
preemption, but such views as presented in an amicus brief 
are “‘entitled to respect’ . . . to the extent [they] ha[ve] the 
‘power to persuade.’” Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 693-94 
(alterations in original) (quoting Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 
U.S. 243, 255-56 (2006)).  See also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 
323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).  
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And, contrary to the Shukers’ argument that “[t]he FDA 
reviews . . . systems, not individual . . . components,” 
Appellant’s Br. 17, the Medical Device Amendments direct 
the FDA, “where necessary to provide reasonable assurance 
of . . . safe and effective performance,” to establish 
performance standards for device components, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360d(a)(2)(B)(i), while the FDA’s regulations require 
manufacturers of finished devices, if “deviations from device 
specifications could occur as a result of the manufacturing 
process,” to monitor and control “component . . . 
characteristics during production.”  21 C.F.R. § 820.70(a)(2).  
What’s more, just like manufacturers of finished devices, 
manufacturers of “components or accessories” are subject to 
device registration and reporting requirements.  Id. 
§§ 803.3(l)(3), 806.2(h)(3), 807.20(a)(6); see id. §§ 803.50, 
806.10.  See generally 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(b), (j), 360i(a)(1), 
(g)(1). 
 
Taken together, the statutory definition of “device,” 
the treatment of off-label uses, and the guidance of the FDA 
all counsel in favor of scrutinizing hybrid systems at the 
component-level.  In that circumstance, § 360k(a) preempts 
any state law “with respect to” a Class III component that is 
“different from, or in addition to” a federal requirement and 
that relates either “to the safety or effectiveness of the device” 
or “to any other matter included in a requirement applicable 
to the device under [the Act].”  21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).  And the 
Riegel test is properly framed at Step One as “whether the 
Federal Government has established requirements applicable” 
to a component of the hybrid system, and at Step Two, 
“whether the [plaintiffs’] claims are based upon [state] 
requirements with respect to [that component] that are 
‘different from, or in addition to,’ the federal ones, and that 
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relate to safety and effectiveness.”  Riegel, 552 U.S. at 321-22 
(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)).  This formulation of Riegel’s 
test for hybrid systems comports with the “‘most basic’ 
interpretive rule that a statute is to be construed so that effect 
is given to all its provisions.”  Doe v. Mercy Catholic Med. 
Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 555 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Corley v. 
United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009)).12 
 
3. Application to the Shukers’ Claims 
We turn next to the application of this test to the 
Shukers’ claims and conclude that both prongs of Riegel are 
satisfied.  At Step One, the R3 metal liner is a Class III 
component that received premarket approval as part of the 
Birmingham Hip Resurfacing System; and that premarket 
approval “imposed requirements on the liner with respect to 
its composition, dimensions, and labeling, among other 
specifications.”  FDA Amicus Br. 7.  See also App. 470-473; 
Shuker, 2015 WL 1475368, at *2-3. 
                                              
 12 Our decision accords with those of the district courts 
that have grappled with the Act’s definition of “device” while 
addressing how the Medical Device Amendments’ express 
preemption provision should apply to devices with 
components of mixed-class designations.  See, e.g., Nagel v. 
Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 15-0927, 2016 WL 4098715, at 
*4-5 (D. Conn. July 28, 2016); Hafer v. Medtronic, Inc., 99 F. 
Supp. 3d 844, 858 (W.D. Tenn. 2015); Bertini v. Smith & 
Nephew, Inc., 8 F. Supp. 3d 246, 255 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); Simon 
v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 2d 395, 405-406 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
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Riegel Step Two is also met, given the different 
requirements that would follow from imposing liability for 
the tort claims at issue; that is, the negligence, strict liability, 
and breach of implied warranty claims of the Second 
Amended Complaint.13  The express preemption provision 
forecloses claims based on “violations of common-law 
duties” to the extent that they impose more than “parallel 
federal requirements,” Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495.  The Shukers’ 
claims, however, would impose requirements “with respect 
to” the R3 metal liner that are “different from, or in addition 
to,” federal ones, 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)), because, as the 
District Court correctly observed, “the heart of each of [the 
Shukers’] claims” challenged the safety and effectiveness of 
the R3 metal liner, Shuker, 2015 WL 1475368, at *11.  
 
Neither in the District Court nor on appeal have the 
Shukers identified any freestanding defect with the Class II 
device or the R3 Acetabular System per se.  To the contrary, 
despite conclusory allegations that the R3 System was 
defective with and without the R3 metal liner that would 
foreseeably be used with it, the Shukers’ negligence, strict 
liability and breach of implied warranty claims rest on the 
                                              
13 Although the Shukers separately asserted ostensibly 
parallel claims based on violations of federal law in their 
Second Amended Complaint, they do not attempt to revive 
those claims on appeal, resting instead on the amended claims 
alleging off-label promotion and asserted in their Third 
Amended Complaint, which we address later in this opinion, 
see infra Part II.B. 
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premise that the R3 System was defective only because it was 
used with the R3 metal liner.  See Tr. of Oral Arg. 79:13-18 
(identifying that the defects arose when “all of the 
components” are used “in tandem”); id. at 7:19-22 
(explaining “[y]ou can’t have the debris coming out without 
the conjunction of the Class 2 and Class 3 components 
coming together.  It’s that friction that causes it.  So it would 
be irresponsible to say . . . [that] only the liner caused the 
metal debris or only the cup caused the metal debris.”).14  
 
                                              
14 Some district courts, in evaluating complaints that 
allege “injuries stemming from the combination of [premarket 
and non-premarket] component parts,” have declined to apply 
express preemption to claims arising from the interaction of 
these mixed class components because “the combination of 
component[s]” itself was not subject to premarket approval.  
Lafountain v. Smith & Nephew, No. 14-1598, 2016 WL 
3919796, at *5-6 (D. Conn. 2015); see also Huskey v. 
Ethicon, 29 F. Supp. 3d 736, 751 (S.D. W. Va. 2014).  These 
courts “decline[d] to separate the device into its component 
parts to create express preemption.”  Lafountain, 2016 WL 
3919796 at *6.  But for the reasons we have explained, see 
Section II.A.2, supra, we think the better reading of the 
statute is to separate a device into its component parts.  See 21 
U.S.C. § 321(h).  Express preemption therefore applies to a 
so-called “combination” claim, like any other, so long as the 
claims are based on state requirements “with respect to” a 
device that are “different from, or in addition to” federal 
requirements.  21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). 
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 Even the failure-to-warn allegations embedded in the 
Shukers’ negligence claim would impose different 
requirements on the R3 metal liner, as the Shukers seek to 
impose liability because defendants did not accompany their 
product with proper warnings regarding the risks associated 
with a premarket-approved device, the R3 metal liner.  But 
the FDA already imposed device-specific labeling 
requirements on the liner, and thus, as the FDA itself points 
out in its amicus submission, “a state warning requirement 
that applie[s] specifically to the use of the R3 system’s 
components with the R3 metal liner in particular” is 
preempted.  FDA Amicus Br. 11 n. 3.15 
 
In sum, the negligence, strict liability, and breach of 
implied warranty claims asserted in the Second Amended 
                                              
15 This is not to say that all failure-to-warn allegations 
as to hybrid systems would be preempted.  On the contrary, as 
the FDA notes, a claim premised on a state requirement that 
the R3 System carry a warning against “use with metal 
liners,” or that it only be used with polyethylene liners, for 
example, “would not implicate § 360k(a)” because “the FDA 
did not impose device-specific labeling requirements on the 
R3 system components.”  FDA Amicus Br. 11.  But such a 
claim is not before us, and to the extent the Shukers take issue 
with the off-label use of the R3 liner as opposed to the 
promotion of that use, their recourse is in a malpractice claim 
against the physician that prescribed the off-label use, not in a 
products liability claim against the Appellees.  See generally, 
e.g., Pa. R. Civ. P. 1042.1 (discussing professional liability 
actions in Pennsylvania); Thierfelder v. Wolfert, 52 A.3d 
1251, 1253-54, 1261, 1264 (Pa. 2012) (same). 
29 
 
Complaint, would impose non-parallel state law requirements 
and are therefore expressly preempted.  We will affirm the 
District Court’s order in that respect. 
B. Claims in the Third Amended Complaint 
 
We turn next to the Shukers’ contention that the 
District Court erred in holding that their off-label promotion 
claims in the Third Amended Complaint failed to state a 
claim.  We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s 
dismissal of those claims, see Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 
629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010), and thus we will affirm 
only if the Shukers did not plead “factual content that allows 
the court to draw the reasonable inference that [Smith & 
Nephew] is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
 
The Shukers’ Third Amended Complaint included 
three state law tort claims based on Smith & Nephew’s 
alleged off-label promotion in violation of federal law: 
negligence, loss of consortium, and fraud.  We assess each 
claim in turn, first acknowledging “the elements [the Shukers] 
must plead to state a claim,” then accepting “all of the 
complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true” while disregarding 
“any legal conclusions,” and finally determining whether the 
well-pleaded factual allegations “plausibly give rise to an 
entitlement to relief.”  Santiago, 629 F.3d at 129-31 (brackets 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  We view the factual 
allegations in the light most favorable to the Shukers and 
construe all reasonable inferences in their favor.  See United 
States ex rel. Customs Fraud Investigations, LLC v. Victaulic 
Co., 839 F.3d 242, 257 (3d Cir. 2016); Connelly v. Lane 
Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 790, 793 (3d Cir. 2016).  If the 
Shukers have specified “the means through which” Smith & 
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Nephew acted unlawfully, included “details” confirming 
those means, and alleged facts connecting those means to 
their own injuries, then we must conclude that they have 
plausibly stated a claim for relief.  Schuchardt v. President of 
the U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 349-50 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 
Applying these principles, we hold that the Shukers 
have met their pleading burden with respect to their 
negligence and loss of consortium claims.  Although they did 
not adequately plead their fraud claim, which they were 
required to plead with particularity, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), 
we will nonetheless vacate the District Court’s dismissal of 
that claim to the extent that it was with prejudice.  We discuss 
each of the Shukers’ three claims from their Third Amended 
Complaint below. 
 
1. Negligence Based on Off-Label Promotion 
The elements of negligence under Pennsylvania law 
are: (1) “a legally recognized duty or obligation of the 
defendant,” (2) “the breach thereof,” and (3) a “causal 
connection” between the breach and the plaintiffs’ damages.  
Green v. Pa. Hosp., 123 A.3d 310, 315-16 (Pa. 2015).16  We 
                                              
16 We assume that Pennsylvania law applies without 
undertaking a choice of law analysis, because both Smith & 
Nephew and the District Court assumed that Pennsylvania 
law applied to the claims in the Third Amended Complaint, 
and because the Shukers have waived any objection to that 
choice of law by failing to make it, see Williams v. BASF 
Catalysts LLC, 765 F.3d 306, 316 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[P]arties 
may waive choice-of-law issues.”). 
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modify these elements somewhat because, for the negligence 
claim alleged here to escape express preemption as a parallel 
claim, the “duty” element must arise from federal 
requirements applicable to a medical device.  Id. at 316; see 
Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330; Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495.  To state a 
parallel negligence claim, then, the Shukers were required to 
plead (1) a duty arising from federal requirements applicable 
to a medical device, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) a causal 
connection between the breach and the Shukers’ injuries. 
 
Construing all reasonable inferences in the Shukers’ 
favor, see Victaulic Co., 839 F.3d at 257, the Shukers’ Third 
Amended Complaint plausibly alleges each of these three 
required elements.  First, as to duty, the complaint alleges that 
the R3 metal liner received premarket approval as part of the 
Birmingham Hip Resurfacing System and was approved 
“only . .  for use with [that] . . . [s]ystem,” App. 473, leading 
to the reasonable inference that the R3 metal liner was a 
“restricted device” under the Medical Device Amendments, 
21 U.S.C. § 360j(e), and that federal law therefore imposed a 
duty on Smith & Nephew to refrain from publishing “false or 
misleading” advertising with respect to the R3 metal liner, 
21 U.S.C. §§ 331(b), 352(q), even if such advertising was for 
the purpose of marketing a separate device, 21 C.F.R. 
§ 801.6. 
 
Second, as to breach, the complaint asserts that, even 
though the FDA did not approve the R3 metal liner for use 
with any hip system other than the Birmingham Hip 
Resurfacing System, Smith & Nephew “actively marketed the 
[R3] metal liner as ‘optional’ for the [separate] R3 Acetabular 
System,” App. 479.  The complaint also cites to Smith & 
Nephew’s February 2009 press release, which explicitly 
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announces “the introduction of a metal liner option for [Smith 
& Nephew’s] R3 Acetabular System.”  App. 14.17  These 
factual allegations give rise to the reasonable inference that 
Smith & Nephew’s marketing was “misleading” regarding the 
FDA-approved uses of the R3 metal liner, 21 U.S.C. § 352(q), 
and that Smith & Nephew breached its duty under federal law 
not to advertise its medical device in that misleading 
manner.18 
 
Finally, as to causation, the Shukers’ Third Amended 
Complaint alleges that Mr. Shuker’s surgeon “either read” or 
“was aware” of the information in Smith & Nephew’s press 
release, that the surgeon proceeded to find the R3 metal liner 
“appropriate” for Mr. Shuker, “given his body habitus and his 
                                              
17 Because we may consider a “document integral to or 
explicitly relied upon in the complaint” in considering a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 292 (3d Cir. 1999), our analysis 
relies on the text of the entire Smith & Nephew press release 
from February 2009, which is reproduced only in part in the 
Shukers’ Third Amended Complaint but is part of the District 
Court record. 
18 To the extent Smith & Nephew contends that a 
dispute of fact exists as to whether Smith & Nephew’s 
promotional materials were false or misleading, the Shukers 
are entitled to discovery to explore this issue for, if discovery 
produces “conflicting evidence,” a factual dispute like this 
one can ripen into a question for a jury to decide.  In re 
Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 852 F.3d 
268, 290 (3d Cir. 2017).  
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activity level,” and that Mr. Shuker endured pain “caused by 
metal sensitivity due to the degeneration of the metal on 
metal articulation” in his hip replacement system.  App. 480, 
483.  Together these factual allegations lead to the reasonable 
inference that Smith & Nephew’s marketing materials caused 
Mr. Shuker’s surgeon to recommend the R3 metal liner and to 
install it within Mr. Shuker’s hip replacement system, a 
course of action which in turn caused Mr. Shuker’s 
subsequent injuries. 
   
Because the factual allegations in the Shukers’ Third 
Amended Complaint allow us reasonably to infer each of the 
three legal elements of the Shukers’ parallel negligence claim, 
the complaint contains sufficient facts to “nudg[e]” that claim 
“across the line from conceivable to plausible,” Iqbal, 556 
U.S. at 683, and hence the District Court’s dismissal of that 
claim was in error. 
 
2. Loss of Consortium 
Loss of consortium is an injury referring to “the impact 
of one spouse’s physical injuries upon the other spouse’s 
marital privileges and amenities,” and, while remaining “a . . . 
distinct cause of action” for “loss of services, society, and 
conjugal affection of one’s spouse,” is a claim “derivative” of 
a spouse’s separate claim of injury.  Darr Constr. Co. v. 
Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 715 A.2d 1075, 1079-80 (Pa. 
1998).  Because we hold the Shukers have adequately pleaded 
a negligence claim premised on Mr. Shuker’s injuries, they 
have also adequately pleaded the derivative claim of loss of 
consortium. 
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The Third Amended Complaint alleges that, after 
Mr. Shuker’s hip replacement surgery and “due to the 
degeneration of the metal on metal articulation,” he 
experienced “buttocks, groin and thigh discomfort” that 
“caused him pain and extremely limited his daily activities.”  
App. 483.  Thus, we can reasonably infer that, because of 
Smith & Nephew’s misleading marketing in violation of 
federal law, the R3 metal liner’s subsequent use in 
Mr. Shuker’s hip replacement surgery, and Mr. Shuker’s 
ensuing “physical injuries,” Mrs. Shuker suffered a loss of her 
husband’s “services, society, and conjugal affection.”  Darr 
Constr., 715 A.2d at 1080.  The Shukers’ loss of consortium 
claim therefore states a facially plausible entitlement to relief 
arising from state requirements that are “parallel” to federal 
ones, Lohr, 518 U.S. at 495; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and 
the District Court erred in dismissing it. 
 
3. Fraud 
In contrast to the Shukers’ pleading of their other 
claims, the Shukers’ pleading of their fraud claim is not 
adequate because it does not satisfy Rule 9(b)’s requirement 
that, though “intent . . . and other conditions of a person’s 
mind may be alleged generally,” plaintiffs “must state with 
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 9(b). 
 
To plead fraud under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff 
must allege (1) “a representation” which is (2) “material to 
the transaction at hand,” (3) “made falsely, with knowledge of 
its falsity or recklessness as to whether it is true or false,” and 
(4) made “with the intent of misleading another into relying 
on it”; (5) “justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation”; and 
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(6) that “the resulting injury was proximately caused by the 
reliance.”  Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882, 889 (Pa. 1994).  But 
in addition, a plaintiff in federal court, to comply with Rule 
9(b), must allege “the date, time and place of the alleged 
fraud or otherwise inject precision or some measure of 
substantiation into a fraud allegation” and must state “the 
circumstances of the alleged fraud with sufficient particularity 
to place the defendant on notice of the precise misconduct 
with which it is charged.”  Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 
F.3d 188, 200 (3d Cir. 2007) (brackets and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
Here, the Shukers’ Third Amended Complaint pleads 
many of the elements of a fraud claim: (1) it alleges that 
Smith & Nephew made “representation[s]” by including and 
incorporating representations Smith & Nephew made 
regarding the R3 metal liner; (2) it alleges “material[ity]” by 
describing those representations’ importance in influencing 
surgeons, such as Mr. Shuker’s surgeon, to use the R3 metal 
liner off-label; (3) it alleges “falsity” by stating that, contrary 
to Smith & Nephew’s representations, the company received 
FDA approval regarding the R3 metal liner’s use within the 
Birmingham Hip Resurfacing system only; and (4) it alleges 
“intent” by contending that Smith & Nephew represented that 
the R3 metal liner was available for use within other hip 
systems, even though the company had never sought FDA 
approval for use within those systems.  Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 
889. 
 
Their complaint comes up short, however, because it 
does not plead the element of “justifiable reliance” on Smith 
& Nephew’s misrepresentation with the particularly required 
for Rule 9(b).  Id.  Specifically, because “[i]t is not enough 
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simply to assert that a statement was ‘fraudulent’ and that 
reliance upon it induced some action,” Blumenstock v. 
Gibson, 811 A.2d 1029, 1038 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002), the 
complaint had to contain details about “the relationship of the 
parties involved and the nature of the transaction,” Drelles v. 
Mfrs. Life Ins. Co., 881 A.2d 822, 841 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).  
Such details are necessary for a reviewing court to determine, 
for example, whether a representation’s “obvious” falsity 
precludes a finding of justifiable reliance, id. at 840, or, if the 
representations at issue were not obviously false, whether the 
representation actually provoked reliance by “induc[ing] or 
influenc[ing] the plaintiff’s [or his agent’s] course of 
conduct,” Commonwealth v. TAP Pharm. Prods., Inc., 36 
A.3d 1112, 1144 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011), vacated on other 
grounds, 94 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2014) (mem.) (per curiam).  
 
The complaint does not meet this standard.  In 
asserting that Mr. Shuker’s surgeon “read” or “was aware” of 
Smith & Nephew’s press release about the R3 metal liner, 
App. 480, the complaint does not provide any details about 
how the press release “induced or influenced” the surgeon’s 
course of conduct, TAP Pharm Prods., 36 A.3d at 1144.  The 
bald assertion that “[the press release’s] claims (or those of 
equal substance) influenced [the surgeon]” does not suffice, 
App. 480, because, at least for Rule 9(b) purposes, that 
statement is merely a “naked assertion[] devoid of further 
factual enhancement,” amounting to “nothing more than a 
formulaic recitation of the element[] of a cause of action,” 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  As the Shukers have not stated “the 
circumstances of the alleged [influence on Mr. Shuker’s 
surgeon] with sufficient particularity to place [Smith & 
Nephew] on notice of the precise misconduct with which it is 
charged,” Frederico, 507 F.3d at 200 (brackets and internal 
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quotation marks omitted), we conclude that the Shukers’ 
fraud claim was insufficiently pleaded under Rule 9(b), and 
we will therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal. 
 
We hold, however, that the District Court erred in 
dismissing the Shukers’ fraud claim with prejudice.  In most 
instances where plaintiffs fail to plead fraud with 
particularity—and especially in cases where plaintiffs may be 
able to supplement their complaints with additional factual 
content after discovery—district courts should dismiss the 
fraud claim “with leave to amend the deficient pleading.”  
5A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure 
§ 1300 (3d ed. 2017); accord Warden v. McLelland, 288 F.3d 
105, 115 (3d Cir. 2002).  Accordingly, given that we will 
reverse the District Court’s dismissal of the negligence and 
loss of consortium claims and allow those claims to proceed 
to discovery, we will vacate the dismissal of the fraud claim 
to the extent that it was with prejudice and without leave to 
amend.19 
 
C. Personal Jurisdiction 
 
Because two of the Shukers’ claims will proceed to 
discovery, we turn now to the Shukers’ challenge to the 
                                              
19 As we are allowing some of the claims in the Third 
Amended Complaint to proceed to discovery, we need not 
address the Shukers’ contention that, if we hold they failed to 
state a claim in their Third Amended Complaint, then they 
were entitled to additional discovery before that complaint 
was filed. 
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District Court’s denial of jurisdictional discovery as to Smith 
& Nephew’s parent company, PLC, and to the District 
Court’s dismissal of PLC for lack of personal jurisdiction.  
We review the District Court’s decision to deny jurisdictional 
discovery for abuse of discretion, see Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. 
Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 455 (3d Cir. 2003), and we 
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s ultimate 
personal jurisdiction determination, see D’Jamoos ex rel. 
Estate of Weingeroff v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94, 101 
(3d Cir. 2009).  As the District Court did not hold an 
evidentiary hearing on personal jurisdiction in this case, we 
take the Shukers’ allegations as true, resolve all factual 
disputes in the Shukers’ favor, and require them merely to 
“establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction . . . .”  
O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (quoting Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 
F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004)).  We separately consider the 
Shukers’ two theories of personal jurisdiction: specific 
personal jurisdiction premised on a “stream-of-commerce” 
theory, and general personal jurisdiction premised on an 
“alter ego” theory.  Appellant’s Br. 14. 
 
We perceive no merit in the Shukers’ stream-of-
commerce theory of personal jurisdiction.  That theory sounds 
in specific personal jurisdiction, which exists when alleged 
injuries “arise out of or relate to” activities ‘“purposefully 
directed” by a defendant toward residents of the forum state.  
Metcalfe v. Renaissance Marine, Inc., 566 F.3d 324, 334 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  The stream-of-commerce theory contends, 
essentially, that specific personal jurisdiction exists over a 
non-resident defendant when that defendant “has injected its 
goods into the forum state indirectly via the so-called stream 
of commerce,” rendering it foreseeable that one of the 
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defendant’s goods could cause injury in the forum state.  
D’Jamoos, 566 F.3d at 104-05.   
 
A plurality of Supreme Court Justices has twice 
rejected the stream-of-commerce theory, see J. McIntyre 
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877-85 (2011) 
(plurality opinion); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 
480 U.S. 102, 108-13 (1987) (plurality opinion), stating, in a 
manner consistent with our own case law, that plaintiffs must 
instead rely on “some act by which the defendant 
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits 
and protections of its laws,” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 109; see 
D’Jamoos, 566 F.3d at 102-03.  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has recently held that “[t]he bare fact that [a non-resident 
defendant] contracted with a [resident] distributor is not 
enough to establish personal jurisdiction in the State.”  
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 
1783 (2017).  We thus have no cause to revisit our Court’s 
precedent on this issue, and we decline to adopt the Shukers’ 
stream-of-commerce theory of specific personal jurisdiction.  
See D’Jamoos, 566 F.3d at 102-06. 
 
To the extent the Shukers seek to establish specific 
personal jurisdiction over PLC without reference to the 
stream-of-commerce theory, their allegations do not meet our 
Circuit’s requirement of purposeful availment: “what is 
necessary is a deliberate targeting of the forum,” O’Connor, 
496 F.3d at 317, so efforts “to exploit a national market” that 
“necessarily included Pennsylvania” are insufficient, 
D’Jamoos, 566 F.3d at 104.  Yet, nationally directed efforts 
are all that the Shukers alleged here, for their factual 
allegations state only that PLC sold its products through 
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Smith & Nephew in Pennsylvania as part of its efforts to sell 
products in the United States generally—not in Pennsylvania 
specifically.  We therefore agree with the District Court’s 
decision to reject the Shukers’ arguments regarding specific 
personal jurisdiction over PLC.   
 
We hold, however, that the Shukers are entitled to 
limited jurisdictional discovery to explore their alter ego 
theory of general personal jurisdiction, i.e., jurisdiction 
arising from a defendant’s “‘continuous and systematic’ 
contacts with the forum, whether or not those contacts are 
related to the [plaintiffs’] cause of action.”  Metcalfe, 566 
F.3d at 334 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. 
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984)).  Unlike the Shukers’ 
stream-of-commerce theory, the alter ego theory finds support 
in our case law, which instructs that, if a subsidiary is merely 
the agent of a parent corporation, see D’Jamoos, 566 F.3d at 
108-09; Lucas v. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc., 666 F.2d 800, 805-
06 (3d Cir. 1981), abrogated in part on other grounds by EF 
Operating Corp. v. Am. Bldgs., 993 F.2d 1046 (3d Cir. 1993), 
or if the parent corporation otherwise “controls” the 
subsidiary, Kehm Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 537 F.3d 290, 300 
(3d Cir. 2008), then personal jurisdiction exists over the 
parent whenever personal jurisdiction (whether general or 
specific) exists over the subsidiary. 
 
Under the alter ego theory, the Shukers’ factual 
allegations regarding PLC, if viewed in isolation, suffice to 
make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction, which is 
all they must do at this juncture.  See D’Jamoos, 566 F.3d at 
102.  Their allegations paint a plausible picture of control by 
PLC over Smith & Nephew: the two companies’ 
decisionmaking is integrated, PLC has authority over Smith 
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& Nephew’s strategic business decisions, PLC pays for the 
development of Smith & Nephew’s products, and executives 
from both companies work together to make decisions 
regarding Smith & Nephew’s hip systems, as shown in a 2012 
Smith & Nephew press release that directed investor and 
media inquiries not to Smith & Nephew employees, but to 
PLC executives.  Given that no party disputes that personal 
jurisdiction exists over Smith & Nephew as PLC’s subsidiary 
in Pennsylvania, the Shukers’ allegations, taken as true and in 
isolation, would suffice to show that PLC controlled Smith & 
Nephew, that Smith & Nephew was PLC’s agent, and that 
personal jurisdiction must exist over both Smith & Nephew 
and PLC in Pennsylvania.  See Kehm Oil, 537 F.3d at 300-01. 
 
Our record, though, is not limited to the Shukers’ 
allegations about personal jurisdiction over PLC; it includes 
declarations from PLC and Smith & Nephew executives that 
contradict many of the Shukers’ assertions.  For instance, the 
executives assert that PLC had “no involvement” in the 
design, manufacture, or distribution of Smith & Nephew’s R3 
Acetabular System for hip replacements in the United States 
and, moreover, that PLC had never approved any business 
decision regarding that system.  App. 320.  Because the 
executives’ declarations create a factual dispute regarding the 
basis for personal jurisdiction over PLC, it is appropriate here 
to allow the parties and the District Court to “revisit[]” the 
factual issues by means of limited jurisdictional discovery, 
which we “ordinarily allow” when a plaintiff’s claim to 
personal jurisdiction “is not clearly frivolous.”20  Metcalfe, 
                                              
20 We note that such jurisdictional discovery “is not a 
license for the parties to engage in a fishing expedition” and 
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566 F.3d at 331, 336.  Accordingly, the District Court abused 
its discretion in denying jurisdictional discovery, and we will 
therefore vacate the dismissal of PLC for lack of personal 
jurisdiction and remand for the District Court to grant the 
Shukers the opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery.21 
 
 
                                                                                                     
that “the District Court should take care to circumscribe the 
scope of discovery . . . to only the factual questions necessary 
to determine its jurisdiction.”  Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 353-
54.  This principle is all the more true after the 2015 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
added a discussion of proportionality to Rule 26(b)(1).  
Victaulic Co., 839 F.3d at 258-59.  Applying that rule here, 
the Shukers may obtain only jurisdictional discovery 
“regarding . . . nonprivileged matter that is relevant to 
[personal jurisdiction over PLC] and proportional to the needs 
of the case,” taking into account “the importance of the 
issue[] at stake . . . , the amount in controversy, the parties’ 
relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, 
the importance of the discovery in resolving the issue[], and 
whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery 
outweighs its likely benefit.”  Id. at 259 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 26(b)(1)). 
21 If evidence adduced from such discovery supports 
the conclusion that personal jurisdiction is proper as to PLC, 
then the Shukers may to seek leave under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) to amend their Third Amended 
Complaint to join PLC as a co-defendant. 
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III. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand to the District Court for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
